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OVERVIEW

in the 1960s and into the 1970s arms control was considered
essential to our national security and the prospect of enduring world peace

restraining development and deployment of nuclear weapons was on
the short list of policy preferences endorsed by most political leaders
iian
and citizens alike we welcomed the test lian
ban treaty the non
proliferation treaty and the anti ballistic missile treaty as important
restraints on nuclear weapons and significant first steps toward peace
these agreements we reasoned lessened the probability of nuclear war
with the reagan presidency the notion of peace through negotiation
or the spirit of detente has lost favor in its place a commitment to
war avoidance through political military nuclear strength has assumed
center stage in our nations security policy consistent with this
commitment the united states since 1980 has augmented its armaments
emphasizing development and deployment of nuclear weapons more
rapidly than during any previous time in its peacetime history
the flurry of anti soviet rhetoric pride in a stronger america
and criticism of past arms control agreements have muffled voices
2 on the
favoring restraint of nuclear weapons through negotiation 20n
1
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premise that deemphasizing the arms control process is contrary to both
our national security and world peace I1 here review two books and
one major article that applaud negotiations in general and arms
control in particular each work builds upon the premise that the
prospect of nuclear war is imminently greater in the absence of arms
negotiations than when reasonable give and take bargaining is actively

enjoined
NUCLEAR WEAPONS A NATIONAL SECURITY DELUSION

in 1945 george F kennan the second ranking civilian diplomat
in the american embassy in moscow was appalled that the soviet
unions westward extension of its boundaries had been permitted
with scarcely a murmur of protest from the western side 3 disturbed
almost to the point of despair kennan sent to washington the
so called long telegram of february 1946 detailing his view that
moscow s territorial advances must not go unchecked his ideas were
soon widely circulated in an article which he published in foreign
affairs 1947 and which he signed X choosing not to identify
himself as author he there wrote in these circumstances it is clear
that the main element of any united states policy toward the soviet
long term patient but firm and vigilant
union must be that of a longterm
containment of russian expansive tendencies 4
while standing firm in his conviction that countering soviet
expansion ought to be a major end of american foreign policy
kennan opposed the means chosen to secure that end in his recent book
the nuclear delusion soviet american relations in the atomic age
kennan notes that in 1948 he hoped that negotiations would soon
begin to remove peacefully the essentially dangerous division of the
european continent 5 but negotiations were not to be the allies chose
another course
it was decided that the main thrust of western policy must now be the
creation of a military alliance directed against the soviet union
gone now was all serious thought of a negotiated political solution to
the problems of the continent
instead of having to pursue
complicated political solutions we could now comfortably revert to the
familiar patterns of old fashioned military rivalry only trying this time
to be better prepared than we had been on the earlier occasions to
confront this supposedly aggressive opponent 6

that the united states would

eschew negotiations in favor of a
military alliance against the soviet union troubled kennan because
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nuclear weapons were to be the core of our military strength As early
as 1949 kennan wrote that he considered the device nuclear
weapons one we ought never again to use or even to plan to use 7
when in response to the soviet detonation of a nuclear device the
united states hastened research and development of the hydrogen
bomb kennan forcefully argued 1950 that america should deplore
the existence and abhor the use of these weapons that we have no
intention of initiating their use against anyone 8
secretary of state dean acheson rejected Ken
nans attempt to
kennans
kenhans
persuade our government to pause at this particular brink the
hydrogen bomb 9 soon thereafter kennan departed government service
Ken
nans endorsement of negotiation and opposition to nuclear
kennans
kenhans
weapons spans nearly forty years for him basing america s national
security on nuclear strength is both unsound and morally offensive
in an essay entitled A christians view of the arms race written
in 1982 and published as the concluding chapter of the nuclear
delusion kennan denounces nuclear weapons use
1I

readiness to use nuclear weapons against other human beings against
people whom we do not know whom we have never seen and whose
guilt or innocence it is not for us to establish and in doing so to place
in jeopardy the natural structure upon which all civilization rests
as though the safety and the perceived interests of our own generation
were more important than everything that has ever taken place or could
take place in civilization this is nothing less than a presumption a
blasphemy an indignity an indignity of monstrous dimensions offered
to god10

kennan believes that we are deluded in the belief that nuclear
weapons contribute to civilizations security and future nuclear
weapons are not instruments of peace but instruments of unconscionable
destruction we ought not to countenance even risk of their use a risk
heightened by failure to negotiate their restraint and possible

elimination
still perhaps because we have avoided nuclear holocaust for nearly
forty years 12 and perhaps because we have come to believe that nuclear
strength is our surest defense against soviet aggression we are deaf
to moral arguments that should move us to vigilantly and patiently
pursue meaningful arms control negotiations we have become weary
of negotiations we perceive detente as but a vehicle used by the soviet
union to advance its view of a desired international order one
dominated by moscow 13 believing as we do we justify our expanding
arsenal of nuclear devices
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the contention that nuclear weapons do not ensure against nuclear
war within acceptable bounds of risk uncertainty and error cannot
be readily dismissed our reliance upon a strategy of peace through
nuclear strength is inadequately complemented by the serious pursuit
of negotiated verifiable restraint in the further development and
deployment of ever more sophisticated and destructive nuclear devices
moreover who can deny kennans
Kennans characterization of the use of nuclear
kenhans
weapons as morally offensive we ought to be able to secure our
interests through more justifiable means
CURRENT STALEMATE

rae
the stalemate
and rag
in deadly gambits the reagan administration andthe
in nuclear arms control strobe talbott reveals that the 1983
breakdown in nuclear arms negotiations was not entirely nor even
principally a product of soviet intransigence the reagan administration
was as much to blame for the interruption in negotiations as were the
russians
talbott documents that those in the first term of the reagan
administration who assumed responsibility for arms control were
extremely critical of the whole enterprise these officials set about to
revolutionize arms control discussions with the soviets henceforth
the US stance would be that of a tough negotiator unwilling to alter
its arms control demands if the soviets wanted agreement then they
would have to assent to the US position
nowhere was this hard line posture more evident than in the
intermediate range nuclear forces INF talks at issue was the
II missiles in
deployment by the united states of cruise and pershing 11
europe as a counterbalance to the soviet unions already deployed
SS 20 missiles in intriguing detail talbott recounts how in private
conversations in the woods in the botanical garden across from the
site of formal negotiations and in restaurants paul nitze the united
sinsky
kvitsinsky
states chief negotiator and his soviet counterpart yuli Kvit
fashioned a deal that each agreed to represent as the proposal of the
Kvitsinsky consulting
other but which actually they jointly shaped 14 kvitsinsky
with his superiors allowed that the soviets might reduce the number
of SS 20 missiles targeted at europe by two thirds if the united states
II missiles deployment of american
would not deploy any pershing 11
cruise missiles was to be allowed 15
thus informally derived the proposed agreement was hand
delivered by the two negotiatory
negotiators to their governments describing the
1I
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turmoil with which the proposal was received in washington talbott
notes that the outcome of the bureaucratic guerilla warfare enjoined
over this issue within the reagan administration was the rejection of
the deal senior officials in the department of state thought the deal
promising demurring only briefly to admit that it was outside the
negotiating instructions that nitze had originally received from the
outset caspar weinberger joined by richard perle the administrations
strongest opponent of arms control fought against the agreement
repeatedly weinberger and perle reasserted the original negotiating
instructions given to nitze either the soviet union agrees to the
option of zero arms in europe or we deploy cruise and pershing
11 missiles as scheduled 16
II
had the soviets agreed to the zero arms proposal talbott
demonstrates the USSR would have found herself without nuclear
missiles to counter french and british land based nuclear weapons that
the original US proposal would have left untouched to agree was
to give the united states a one sided arms control victory predictably
the soviets did not accept the original US position and soon they
too disavowed interest in the nitzekvitsinsky deal
similar evidence attests to Tal
botts conclusion that the reagan
talbotts
administration was only slightly less obstructionist in the strategic arms
IMF talks the apparent intention
reductions talks START As with INF
of the administration orchestrated by the department of defense
was to buy time for rearmament eschewing any serious negotiation
of arms control agreements until the united states raised its military
strength talbott concludes
in both negotiations the administrations principal concern was to keep
II
military programs on track the pershing 11
il and tomahawk missiles in
strategic modernization program in START that
meant the administration had to be pushed to the bargaining table by
political forces 17
INF and an ambitious

the

evidence talbott provides in support of his position that
the united states deliberately slowed the INF and START arms
control process leaves little doubt that during its first term the reagan
administration courted the public image of a serious negotiator but
rejected potentially beneficial arms agreements in the interest of
augmenting its weapons supply the costs of such action in Tal
botts
talbotts
opinion have been unacceptably high

the administrations

conduct of the INF talks and START brought about
an unprecedented crisis in the already strained quarter century old arms
control process and the crisis in arms control contributed to three
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others in the alliance between the US and western europe in the
partnership between the executive and legislative branches of the US
government and in the soviet american relationship 18
STAR WARS AND ARMS CONTROL

after fifteen months the united states and the soviet union

have returned to geneva presumably to negotiate arms restraint
however it remains unlikely that they will readily set aside their
differences recent negotiation failures incriminations declared by
each against the other the notably strained soviet american
relationship and ongoing ever more rapid arms buildup surely
complicate the prospect of future meaningful negotiations yet as
great as these obstacles to successful negotiations are our refusal to
negotiate star wars poses the greatest impediment to furthering
the arms control process
in an important article in foreign affairs mcgeorge bundy

robert S mcnamara and gerard smith
compellingly demonstrate that the president may choose star wars
or arms control but not both they further assert that if we pursue
george F

kennan

star wars we have little guarantee that it will accomplish what is hoped
and even if it were successful in its stated mission numerous other
means are available to the soviets to deliver nuclear weapons against
the united states
star wars cannot be achieved they contend to this point
leak proof defense against
they argue there is no prospect for a leakproof
strategic ballistic missiles alone and it entirely excludes from its
range any effort to limit the effectiveness of other systems bomber
aircraft cruise missiles and smuggled warheads 19 while the
probability of success is very low the likelihood that the soviets
can build upon already existing capabilities to penetrate such a defense
is very high
As troubling as this concern is their most compelling argument
is that precisely because the weapons are so terrible neither of the
super powers can tolerate the notion of impotence in the face
two superpowers
of the arsenal of the opponent consequently any serious development
of star wars will stimulate the most energetic soviet efforts to
ensure the continued ability of soviet warheads to get through the
authors firmly conclude that it is fanciful in the extreme to suppose
that the prospect of any new american deployment which could
undermine the effectiveness of soviet missile forces will not be met
by a most determined and sustained response 20 obviously the soviets

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol25/iss1/13

6

Hollist: War, Peace, and Arms Control: A Review Essay

war

peace

any
arms control
and
andarms

173

will not agree to limit their offensive nuclear weapons in the face of
our commitment to star wars indeed the strategic defense initiative
or star wars will likely prove as obstructionist to present arms
control bargaining as was the zero arms option to the intermediate
nuclear forces talks
still some contend if star wars can be developed we may be
able to defend against a significant portion of the soviet nuclear arsenal
however even if star wars could achieve part of this objective
to commit ourselves to such a defense is fraught with extraordinary
risk bundy kennan mcnamara and smith assert that a star wars
defense must work perfectly the very first time since it can never
be tested in advance as a full system 21 moreover it must be
triggered almost instantly because the crucial boost phase of soviet
missiles lasts less than five minutes from the moment of launch in
that period there must be detection decision aim attack and kill 22
given the nature of such a system they conclude it is hard to
imagine a scheme further removed from the kind of tested reliability
and clear presidential control that we have hitherto required of systems
involving nuclear danger 23
they summarily conclude that the presidents program offers
no promise of effective defense against anything but ballistic missiles
and since this leaves numerous other nuclear capabilities undefended
the risk of nuclear crisis will persist despite the heavy costs of star wars
therefore the inescapable reality is that there is literally no hope
that star wars can make nuclear weapons obsolete 24 moreover star
wars will destroy the anti ballistic missile ABM treaty our most
important arms control agreement it will directly stimulate both
offensive and defensive systems on the soviet side and as long as it
continues it will darken the prospect for significant improvement in
the currently frigid relations between moscow and washington it will
thus sharpen the very anxieties the president wants to reduce 25

conclusion
together these authors convincingly advance the case for arms
negotiations as a means to furthering our national security and
promoting world peace A policy of negotiating in the hope of securing
world peace beginning with nuclear arms restraint by itself likely will
not secure our national interest or assure world peace but neither should
it be dismissed in favor of the uncertain morally questionable security
that we believe nuclear weapons provide at the very least we ought
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to listen to the case for arms control before we consent to the case
against it these books by george F kennan and strobe talbott and
the article in foreign affairs deserve our careful study

NOTES
since 1980 defense spending has taken an increasing share of the federal budget while the percentage
his declined for fiscal year 1986 defense spending accounted for nearly 26 percent
going to social programs has
of total government spending compared to 23 percent in 1980 during that same period entitlements
including social security medicare and other assistance programs dropped from 47 percent to 43 percent
in constant dollars defense spending has increased 31 percent during the past six years while social spending
management and budget the united
U S office of ofmanagement
states budget in brief
stutes
has gone up only 11 percent see US
unitedstates
D C government printing office 1986 also see U
1987 washington DC
USS congress house report on
the subdivision of budget totals for fiscal year 1986 99th cong ist sess 1985 H rept 333
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kennan nuclear delusion xiv
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ibid
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71bid
hbid
abid xv
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91bid
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slbid pvn
slbil
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bid 206 7
in an address entitled let Us have peace reported in the deseret news on 30 august 1945
that to ensure peace
clark said we are being generously dosed with that sovereign narcotic
J reuben dark
we must maintain a great army and gigantic armaments but this ignores indeed conceals the unvarying
historical fact that big armies have always brought not peace but wars
armament does not spell peace
J reuben clarks statement is also cited in edwin brown firmage and christopher L blakesley
b7igham
bngham young university studies 13 spring 1973
clark jr law and international order bigham
J reuben clarkjr
334 the sentence armament does not spell peace is not in the BYU studies article admittedly
president oark
clark was not speaking specifically of nuclear weapons but the sentiment isis very similar to that
dark
expressed by kennan
while we have avoided nuclear holocaust to this point we have on occasion been on the brink of that
5
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Tal
botts evidence suggests that some in the administration specifically richard perle reasoned that
talbotts
the zero arms option would not be acceptable to the soviet union that the soviets would reject the deal
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lus rearmament without
ius
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